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Business Groups and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China 
Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of firms’ business group affiliations on their performance 
in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the context of China. We find that firms with a 
dual-status of simultaneously being a business group member and a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) have weaker CSR performance. Our finding is consistent with the view that CSR 
engagement is a strategy for firms to pursue political legitimacy from the government and 
seek legitimacy in general from the public. The business group affiliation and the SOE 
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A business group is a prevalent organizational structure around the world, particularly 
in emerging markets (Khanna, 2000). It is a coalition of companies that are legally separate 
but bound together by a controlling firm either directly or indirectly through economic or 
social connections (Granovetter, 1995; Fan, Jin, & Zheng, 2016). Many prior studies (e.g., 
Keister, 1998, 2009; Carney, Shapiro, & Tang, 2009; Guest & Sutherland, 2010; He, Mao, 
Rui, & Zha, 2013) have investigated the effect of business groups on their member firms’ 
financial performance, but the impact of groups on member firms’ performance in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has remained unexplored. This study intends to fill the void by 
examining the CSR performance of Chinese firms affiliated with business groups. Given the 
growing interest around the globe in CSR, it is important to understand how business groups, 
a ubiquitous economic construct in emerging markets (e.g., Brazil, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, and Thailand) and also in some developed countries such as 
Italy and Sweden (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), affect member firms in this aspect. 
We choose to conduct the study in the China context because this country’s special 
institutional environment provides researchers with great opportunities to examine business 
groups and CSR related issues. After three decades of rapid growth, China has become the 
second-largest economy in the world. This country’s spectacular economic achievement has 
come with a big price of the severely polluted natural environment and pressing social 
problems. In view of the environmental and societal challenges, the Chinese government has 
advocated a “Harmonious Society” and urged companies to be socially responsible since 
2006 (See, 2009; Marquis, Zhang, & Zhou, 2011). Business groups, a structure encouraged 
and supported by the Chinese government (Keister, 1998; Ma & Lu, 2005; Guest & 
Sutherland, 2010) and being a major actor in the country’s economic development, 














there is no systemic evidence showing whether Chinese firms associated with business 
groups perform better or worse in CSR than stand-alone companies. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to provide large sample empirical evidence concerning this 
important issue.  
Specifically, we examine a Chinese sample of 3,035 firm-year observations from 
2009 to 2014 to find out whether there is a difference in CSR performance between firms 
affiliated with business groups (hereafter BG firms) and stand-alone companies (non-BG 
firms). The sample firms are publicly traded in one of two stock exchanges in China and 
issue at least one CSR report during the sample period. We identify firms’ business group 
affiliations by manually collecting data from firms’ annual reports and websites. We use CSR 
scores from the RKS, the leading CSR rating agency in China, to measure firms’ CSR 
performance.  
Our data analysis provides evidence that non-BG firms perform better than BG firms 
in CSR. This finding applies to not only the overall CSR performance measured by the total 
CSR score but also four dimensions of CSR performance measured by four components of 
the total score. Furthermore, after we divide the sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and non-SOEs, it reveals that our prior finding continues to hold in the subsample of SOEs 
but not in the subsample of non-SOEs. That is, among SOEs, BG firms have poorer CSR 
performance than non-BG firms, while among non-SOEs, there is no significant difference in 
CSR performance between BG and non-BG firms. Our empirical tests control for various 
factors that the prior literature (e.g., Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Marquis & Qian, 2014; 
Lau, Lu, & Liang, 2016) finds to affect CSR performance, including: (1) firms’ economic 
characteristics such as size, financial performance, the proportion of cash holdings, leverage, 
and firm age; (2) corporate governance variables such as board size, board independence, 














structure; and (3) some other relevant factors such as the regional development level, 
voluntary disclosure, and stock cross-listing.  
Our results suggest that a firm’s dual-status of both possessing a business group 
affiliation and being an SOE leads to poorer performance in CSR. The finding is consistent 
with the view that CSR engagement is a strategy for firms to pursue political legitimacy from 
the government and to seek legitimacy in general from the public. Being a member of a 
business group and being an SOE at the same time afford political legitimacy to the firm and 
also reduce the need to pursue general legitimacy due to the relatively secure environment 
provided by the group. This study has implications for policymakers as well as the general 
public. Our finding is particularly thought-provoking when viewed in conjunction with the 
prior findings regarding the effect of Chinese business groups on firms’ financial 
performance. Keister (1998) finds that business groups in China had a positive impact on 
firms’ financial performance during the early years of the country’s economic reform when 
market institutions were severely underdeveloped. In more recent years, however, when 
markets improve and become more established, business groups have started to hinder 
competitiveness and flexibility of member firms and consequently impair firms’ financial 
performance (Keister, 2009; Carney, 2009). If business groups in China are no longer 
beneficial to member firms’ financial performance and at the same time foster poorer CSR 
performance, then the validity of this type of economic structure in this country nowadays is 
questionable. Even if business groups remain helpful to member firms’ financial success to 
some extent,1 it is still debatable whether economic achievements shall be attained at the 
expense of weaker CSR performance. 
Being the first study to investigate systemically BG firms’ CSR performance in 
China, this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the CSR 
                                                 
1 Guest and Sutherland (2010) report that member firms of 100 or so “national champion” trial groups perform 














literature that has developed rapidly worldwide during the past two to three decades (e.g., 
Matten & Moon, 2008; Moser & Martin, 2012; Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Shabana, 
Buchholtz, & Carroll, 2017) and has started to grow in the China context during recent years 
(e.g., See, 2009; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Liao, Lin, & Zhang, 2016; Hofman, Moon, & Wu, 
2017). Second, it enriches the literature on business groups (e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap, & 
Scharfstein, 1991; Keister, 1998; Shin & Park, 1999; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; He et al., 
2013), which so far has focused primarily on financial outcomes and barely examined the 
CSR area. And third, this study contributes to the research on China (e.g., Sutherland, 2003; 
Keister, 1998, 2000, 2009; Marquis et al., 2011; Huang & Rong, 2017; Yu, Fang, Sun, & Du, 
2018), a country that has drawn increasing attention from scholars around the world due to its 
fast-growing economic significance and various controversial issues accompanying its 
economic development. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe 
the institutional background, review the relevant literature, and develop our hypotheses. 
Thereafter, we describe the data, sample, and research design. The subsequent section 
discusses the empirical results. Lastly, we summarize and conclude the study. 
2. Institutional background, prior literature, and hypothesis development 
2.1. Business groups and development of CSR in China 
As the institutional environment greatly influences firms’ involvement in CSR 
activities (Matten & Moon, 2008), we review the institutional background in China regarding 
business groups and the development of CSR. In China, forming and developing business 
groups (qiye jituan) are one component of the economic reforms that the government has 
carried out since the late 1970s. Policymakers studied Japan’s keiretsu and Korea’s chaebol 














Committee in 1978 first encouraged links among Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Ma & Lu, 2005), and in the mid-1980s, the government started to allow firms to acquire 
ownership rights of each other in many industries (Dong & Hu, 1995; Keister, 1998). In 
1986, the concept of “business group” appeared in the State Council’s official documents for 
the first time, indicating that the state was serious about developing this type of economic 
structure (Ma & Lu, 2005). Although business groups were initially built among SOEs, many 
entrepreneurs in the non-state sectors followed suit when they recognized various benefits of 
doing so.2 By the end of 2008, there were nearly 3,000 large business groups across all the 
economic sectors in China, 3  with total assets of around US$ six trillion, revenues of 
approximately US$ four trillion, profits of about US$ 210.58 billion, and employees of nearly 
33 million (National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), 2009).4 In addition, over the 
years, the state has selected a subset of 100 or so large and institutionally advanced business 
groups as prestigious “national champion” trial groups aimed at being internationally 
competitive and leading China’s integration into the world economy (Sutherland, 2003; Guest 
& Sutherland, 2010). In the 2009 list of Global Fortune 500 Companies, 38 are Chinese firms 
affiliated with business groups (NBSC, 2009). 
A business group can bring substantial benefits to its member firms. A major reason 
why groups are ubiquitous in emerging markets is that they substitute for imperfect markets 
and complement underdeveloped institutions (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). For example, internal 
financing among member firms, a common characteristic of many business groups, appears 
                                                 
2 Chinese domestic firms have three types of ownership structures: state, collective, and private. The collective 
is an ownership structure between state-owned and private.  
3 “Large” business groups include the following: business groups owned by the central government, “national 
champion” trial groups approved by the State Council, business groups approved by the concerned departments 
of the State Council, business groups approved by the provincial governments and by the concerned 
departments of the provincial governments, and any other business groups with annual revenues plus end-of-
year assets of at least 500 million Chinese Yuan (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009). 
4 All monetary values are initially reported in Chinese Yuan by NBSC (2009). We convert them into US dollars 
based on the average exchange rate of year 2008, which is 0.1444 (Chinese Yuan: US dollar) and is obtained 














to substitute for a formal financial system and provides firms with scarce capital that is 
unavailable from a fledgling market (Goto, 1982; Fan et al., 2016). Besides internal financing, 
prior studies (Nolan & Wang, 1999; Keister, 2000) suggest that Chinese business groups 
combine and distribute various resources among member firms, including management skills, 
research and development centers, brands, and sales services. In addition, connections among 
member firms improve interfirm information flow, reduce the uncertainty of their business 
environments, and enhance the collective power (economic, political, and social) of united 
actions – benefits that are particularly valuable to Chinese firms during the country’s 
economic transition (Keister, 1998).  
Regarding firms’ social responsibility, global companies have started to issue CSR 
reports since the 1990s, and more than 50% of the 250 largest firms in the world have 
provided reports by 2005 and over 90% by 2011 (KPMG, 2005, 2011). In China, however, 
the first CSR report did not appear until 2006 when the government signaled that CSR was an 
appropriate and desired activity (Marquis et al., 2011). In that year, the Chinese Communist 
Party introduced the policy of a “Harmonious Society”, which was widely viewed as a shift 
from a model of economic growth at all cost to one of economic growth balanced with the 
need to tackle pressing societal and environmental problems (See, 2009). In the same year, 
the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Communist Party Committee Congress stated that the 
government would strive to “create a harmonious situation in which everyone promotes 
harmony, and focusing on enhancing a sense of social responsibility amongst citizens, 
enterprises and all kinds of organizations” (Sino-Swedish CSR Cooperation, 2009). The 
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, China’s two stock markets owned by the state, 
issued guidelines in 2006 and 2008, respectively, to encourage listed companies to engage in 
socially responsible activities and issue CSR reports (Marquis & Qian, 2014). The year 2008 














2.2. Hypothesis development 
It is not clear, ex ante, whether firms affiliated with business groups would perform 
better or worse in CSR than stand-alone companies in China. On the one hand, it would be 
natural to expect that business groups act in accordance with the state’s expressed interest in 
CSR since the state has been supportive of the groups. In addition, prior research (e.g., 
Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Reverte, 2009) finds that larger firms and firms with higher 
political or social visibility are more likely to involve in CSR activities. Business groups 
appear to be well situated in fulfilling firms’ social responsibility given their relatively larger 
size, more prestigious social status, and stronger supporting systems for their members. 
Hence, member firms of business groups are likely to do a better job in CSR than other firms. 
On the other hand, there are also reasons why BG firms may have weaker CSR 
performance than other firms. Acting in a socially responsible manner under the China 
context can be seen as a strategy for firms to pursue political legitimacy (Marquis & Qian, 
2014). While customers and investors are often considered the most important constituencies 
for a western company, the government is positioned at the top of the CSR pyramid in China 
as a vital stakeholder of a firm (ChinaCSR.com, 2009). Governments usually control critical 
resources that affect firms’ business environments and economic advantages. For example, a 
government can issue regulations that impact a particular industry, develop tax policies 
favoring certain regions, or grant import relief to protect firms from foreign competitions 
(Jones, 1991; Baron, 1995; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997). In China, the government is a 
powerful actor in the economy and controls firms’ business opportunities through, among 
other things, “industry access control, new investment ratification, value-added tax 
differentiation, control of pace and pattern of privatization or decentralization, and 














marketing” (Luo, 2003, pp. 1319). Therefore, it is essential for firms in China to possess 
political legitimacy. 
A BG firm likely enjoys stronger political legitimacy than a non-BG counterpart 
because the government supported and has continued to support business groups as part of its 
economic reform. Marquis and Qian (2014) argue that for firms with political legitimacy, 
they less need to use government encouraged activities to pursue the desired status and obtain 
valuable resources from the state. Their argument reveals an irony in how different types of 
firms in China respond to government signals: the government encourages all firms to be 
socially responsible, but this message will have a stronger effect on those that have a stronger 
need to enhance their political legitimacy. Compared with a BG firm, a stand-alone company 
has relatively lower political legitimacy and hence more need to engage in CSR activities in 
order to create goodwill with the government and gain resources that are already easier for a 
BG firm to obtain. Applying this view, one would expect a BG firm to be less diligent in 
conducting CSR activities. 
Potential motivations for firms to engage in CSR activities include not only to gain 
political legitimacy from the government but also to attain legitimacy in general from the 
public. Legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995; Chen & Roberts, 2010) proposes that a firm’s 
survival depends on its ability to meet expectations of the society in which it operates. 
Incongruence between the value system of a firm and that of the society jeopardizes the 
firm’s continued existence because civil society has the authority to permit or disallow an 
organization to exist and conduct business within that society (Cho, Laine, Roberts, & 
Rodrigue, 2015). In China, the public expectation of socially responsible organizations has 
grown increasingly strong in recent years due to widespread outrage towards deteriorating 














and infant formula, unsafe toys, and toxic pork. Good CSR performance hence can help a 
firm gain legitimacy from the general public. 
It is likely that stand-alone companies have a stronger need to pursue legitimacy than 
member firms of business groups because prior literature finds that BG firms are situated in a 
more supportive and less risky environment than other firms. For example, He et al. (2013) 
find that business groups in China help member firms overcome constraints in raising 
external capital for investment projects, presumably by pooling funds from different affiliates 
and reallocating them to the most profitable uses. Hoshi et al. (1991) and Shin and Park (1999) 
report similar findings with Japanese industrial groups and Korean chaebols, respectively. 
Business groups can also provide security to member firms by sharing risks through resource 
transferring from a well-performing affiliate to a poorly performing one in financial distress. 
He et al. (2013) examine Chinese business groups and provide evidence consistent with this 
view. The purposes for a business group to help member firms in adverse economic 
conditions include ensuring the whole group’s long-run survival (Prowse, 1992) and 
establishing among members financial cross guarantees that serve as the basis for an internal 
capital market (Shin & Park, 1999). As a failing firm in a group can resort to funds from 
other members, this greatly reduces the firm’s business risks and insulates it from the 
discipline of the market. If a BG firm faces less a threat of survival and fewer constraints of 
funding for further development, then it will have weaker motivations than a stand-alone 
company to engage in CSR activities and thus to gain legitimacy.  
In summary, there are reasons to expect BG firms to perform better in CSR than 
stand-alone companies but there are also theories predicting the opposite. If the view of firm 
visibility and the notion of mutual-support between the state and business groups play a 
dominant role, then BG firms would have better CSR performance than other firms; if the 














Given the competing predictions, we state the hypothesis without a direction and test this 
issue empirically.  
Hypothesis 1: The CSR performance is different between firms with business group 
affiliations (BG firms) and stand-alone companies (non-BG firms). 
 
One conspicuous characteristic of Chinese firms is that many are owned by the state, 
commonly known as state-owned enterprises or SOEs. As SOEs and private firms face 
different incentives, it is necessary to examine the impact of business group affiliations on the 
two types of firms separately. A firm that possesses the dual-status of being a business group 
member and an SOE at the same time likely behaves differently in CSR. 
SOEs have conflicting motivations to either actively engage in CSR or not treat it 
seriously. On the one hand, since the state is the largest and also controlling shareholder of 
SOEs, actions of the firms are to a great extent subject to governmental interference (Li & 
Zhang, 2010) and hence SOEs may perform better in CSR. As discussed previously, with the 
advocation of a “Harmonious Society” by the government since 2006, promoting CSR has 
entered the political agenda in China (See, 2009). In January 2008, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) issued CSR guidelines for SOEs, 
which state that fulling CSR is “an ardent expectation and requirement from the public” to 
SOEs.5 In China, the vast majority of SOE managers are directly appointed by their superior 
government officials, and thus politicians can significantly influence the behavior of SOEs 
via the managers whom they appointed (Mi & Wang, 2000). Bai and Xu (2005) find evidence 
that the Chinese government places non-financial objectives into the CEO contracts of some 
SOEs and hence executives of those firms are likely to put efforts to meet non-financial 
                                                 
5 The English version of the guidelines is available at http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477196/content.html; 















expectations of the government.6 To summarize, the notion of governmental interference or 
control suggests that SOEs would conform to the social and political goals of the state by 
acting as role models in CSR. 
On the other hand, the view of political legitimacy predicts that SOEs have weak 
incentives to conduct CSR activities diligently. In China and many other emerging markets, 
where the rule of law is lacking, enforcement of existing rules is weak, and the legal and 
political infrastructure is underdeveloped, it can be difficult for firms to know how to 
properly interpret and effectively respond to signals from the government (Peng & Heath, 
1996; He & Tian, 2008; Marquis et al., 2011). In our context, the signals are the CSR related 
guidelines and statements issued by the government. Li and Zhang (2007) argue that SOEs 
possess political legitimacy and are supported or even protected by the government agencies 
that have established them. Similarly, Marquis and Qian (2014) propose that SOEs have the 
most political legitimacy and thus the least need to use government encouraged activities to 
pursue advantageous positions and valuable resources from the state. Therefore, the 
perspective of political legitimacy predicts that SOEs would not treat CSR seriously. 
As different theories lead to conflicting predictions about an SOE’s performance in 
CSR, we refrain from making a directional hypothesis and empirically test the combined 
effect of the SOE status plus the business group affiliation. Our second hypothesis hence is 
stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that both belong to business groups and are state-owned (BG-
plus-SOE firms) have different CSR performance compared with other firms. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Bai and Xu (2005) do not explicitly discuss CSR as one of the potential non-financial objectives since the 














3. Data, sample, and research design 
3.1. Data sources and sample construction 
This study covers all Chinese firms that are listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges and file CSR reports from 2009 to 2014. Data for the empirical tests come from 
multiple sources. We obtain firms’ financial data from the China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, the leading data source of Chinese stock markets and listed 
companies. Firms’ CSR ratings are from the CSR rating agency RKS (also known by its 
Chinese name RunLing), the primary data source for research on CSR in China (e.g., Marquis 
& Qian, 2014; Lau et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2016). We manually collect data from companies’ 
annual reports and websites to identify a firm’s affiliation with a business group. Lastly, the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China provides the macro-level data concerning provincial 
development. After merging all the needed data, we obtain a sample of 3,035 firm-year 
observations during the sample period, which starts from 2009 because it is the earliest year 
that RKS’ CSR ratings are available with detailed information.7 
Table 1 presents our sample distribution by year. Panel A shows the distribution of 
firm-year observations from 2009 to 2014. The number of total observations is 3,035, which 
is very close (94%) to 3,230, the number of total CSR reports issued by listed firms during 
this period. We lose a small number of CSR report issuers due to missing data for some 
control variables. As our sample closely approximates the whole population of CSR report 
issuers during the six years, the statistics displayed in Table 1 are very similar to those for the 
population. We see that the number of CSR report issuers increases over time, from less than 
400 in 2009 to more than 600 in 2014, consistent with the society’s increasing concerns over 
CSR issues and also in line with China’s growing number of publicly listed firms on the two 
stock exchanges. During the sample period, around 18% to 24% of all publicly traded firms 
                                                 















have released CSR reports. Panel B presents the distribution of business group affiliated firms 
(BG firms) in our sample. We see that BG firms account for a large proportion 
(approximately 76%) of the whole sample, indicating that business groups are a very popular 
organizational structure among Chinese listed firms that release CSR reports. Our statistic of 
76% is close to what is reported by Claessens, Fan, and Lang (2006, pp.7, Table 1) about the 
average percentage (68%) of their sample firms affiliated with groups in nine East Asia 
countries/jurisdictions.8 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is firms’ CSR performance. Following prior 
research (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Lau et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2016), we use CSR ratings 
from the RKS (www.rksratings.com) as the measure. The RKS is an independent and leading 
CSR rating agency in China, providing ratings primarily based on CSR reports issued by 
Chinese listed firms. Marquis and Qian (2014) have conducted a variety of tests that prove 
the validity of using the RKS’ CSR ratings as the proxy for CSR performance. Compared 
with the CSR rating data analyzed in prior studies, the ratings currently available from the 
RKS are constructed under a slightly modified and refined system. Specifically, firms’ CSR 
engagements are evaluated in four (instead of three in prior studies) dimensions: (1) 
Macrocosm, which includes 16 evaluation items concerning a firm’s overall CSR strategy 
and corporate governance. (2) Content, which encompasses 30 evaluation items regarding a 
firm’s specific CSR activities, such as in the areas of environment protection, consumer 
rights, labor and human rights, and community development. (3) Technique, which covers 17 
evaluation items about the disclosure quality of a firm’s CSR report, such as 
comprehensiveness, comparability, consistency, and reliability of information disclosed in the 
                                                 














report. (4) Industry, which is the newly added dimension containing industry-specific 
evaluation items. In total, there are 63 evaluation items plus a few industry-specific criteria. 
The full mark of the CSR rating is 100 points, with the weights of 30%, 45%, 15%, and 10% 
for the components of Macrocosm, Content, Technique, and Industry, respectively. We use 
the total score of a firm’s CSR rating in year t (CSR Score) as the main measure of CSR 
performance and use the scores of the four individual components for robustness tests. 
 
3.3. Independent variable 
The independent variable in this study is the business group affiliation (BGroup). It is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is affiliated with a business group in year t, and 
zero otherwise. Following prior studies (Xin, Zheng, & Yang, 2007; Dou, Zhang, & Lu, 
2014), we code a firm as belonging to a business group (BGroup = 1) if the firm’s largest 
shareholder owns other companies that generate revenues by providing non-financial 
products or services. A non-BG firm (BGroup = 0) is the one whose largest shareholder does 
not own other companies in the non-financial sectors. If a firm’s largest shareholder is a 
government agency, this firm is also coded as a non-BG firm (BGroup =0) because, in China, 
many firms are owned by some government agencies without being substantially connected. 
Information about a firm’s largest shareholder is manually collected from the firm’s 
annual reports and website. Our coding of the BG firms is based on a firm’s ownership 
connection, which likely is the most important link among a group of firms. We are mindful 
that some studies use different ways to identify BG firms, but we believe that our method 
best serves the purposes of this study. For example, He et al. (2013) rely on a survey 
conducted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission to determine a firm’s group 
affiliation, but unfortunately, the survey data is not available after 2006. Fan et al. (2016) 














non-listed parent firm and its listed subsidiary firm. Guest and Sutherland (2010) focus on 
firms affiliated with 100 or so prestigious “national champion” trial groups and therefore 
examine a sample restricted to those particular groups.  
 
3.4. Empirical model 
To test the hypotheses, we use the following OLS regression model (with the firm and 
year subscripts omitted for brevity): 
CSR Score = b0 + b1 BGroup + b2 Size + b3 ROA + b4 Cash + b5 Leverage  
                     + b6 FirmAge+ b7 SOE + b8 B-Size + b9 B-Indep + b10 B-F-Exp  
                     + b11 TMT-F-Exp + b12 Fem-CEO + b13 Own-Con + b14 Reg-Dep  
                     + b15 Voluntary + b16 CrossList + b17 SH-Exch + ɛ                                          (1) 
The dependent variable is CSR Score and the independent variable is BGroup as discussed 
before. The control variables are various factors that the prior literature (Di Giuli & 
Kostovetsky, 2014; Marquis & Qian, 2014; Lau et al., 2016) finds to affect a firm’s CSR 
performance. These factors can be categorized into three groups: firm economic 
characteristics, corporate governance variables, and other relevant factors. We measure all 
control variables at the end of year t-1 unless specified otherwise. In all our regression tests, 
standard errors are clustered at the firm dimension. 
The group of control variables regarding a firm’s economic characteristics includes 
the following factors: (1) Firm size (Size), computed as the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
A larger firm is likely to have better CSR performance. (2) Return on assets (ROA), which 
measures a firm’s financial performance and is computed as the firm’s net income divided by 
total assets. A firm with better financial performance is likely to have more resources for 
CSR activities and hence achieve better CSR performance. (3) Cash, computed as a firm’s 














activities. (4) Leverage, computed as a firm’s total debts scaled by total assets. A firm with a 
larger portion of debts is less likely to engage in CSR activities. (5) Firm age (FirmAge), the 
logarithm of the number of years since a firm was established. Marquis and Qian (2014) find 
that older firms in China have poorer CSR performance, presumably because older firms 
were founded when state control of the economy was more extensive and hence are less 
sensitive than younger firms to the CSR initiatives diffusing around the globe in recent years. 
(6) State-owned enterprise (SOE), which is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is a state-
owned enterprise and zero otherwise. Marquis and Qian (2014) argue that SOEs and privately 
owned firms are likely to respond differently to CSR initiatives encouraged by the 
government. 
Lau et al. (2016) find that Chinese firms with stronger corporate governance systems 
have better CSR performance. Following their study, we control for a number of governance 
factors for each firm: (1) Board size (B-Size), measured by the total number of directors on 
the board. The size of the board affects the diversity of ideas and hence is likely to influence 
a firm’s CSR performance. (2) Board independence (B-Indep), measured by the ratio of 
outside directors on the board. A more independent board likely advocates the firm to be 
socially responsible. (3) Board foreign experience (B-F-Exp), measured by the ratio of board 
members who have foreign experience. Foreign experience is defined as either educational or 
working experience gained overseas. (4) Top management team foreign experience (TMT-F-
Exp), measured by the ratio of members in the top management team (TMT) who have 
foreign experience. Foreign experience is defined the same as before. Board and TMT 
members with foreign/international experience are expected to lead to better CSR 
performance. (5) Female CEO (Fem-CEO), a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is 
female and zero otherwise. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) find that female CEOs 














with stakeholders (Wang & Coffey, 1992; Zhang, Zhu, & Ding, 2013). (6) Ownership 
concentration (Own-Con), measured by the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. Lau et al. (2016) find that a concentrated ownership structure has a negative 
impact on the firm’s CSR performance. 
Some other factors that may affect a firm’s CSR engagement include the following: 
(1) Regional development (Reg-Dep), measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita of the province where a firm is headquartered. We obtain a province’s GDP and 
population data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Marquis and Qian (2014) 
report that firms located in more developed regions perform better in CSR activities, likely 
due to more effective monitoring by government agencies in those regions and higher interest 
in CSR from people living in more wealthy areas. (2) Voluntary disclosure (Voluntary), a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm voluntarily releases its CSR report without regulatory 
requirements, and zero otherwise. Specifically, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
mandates three types of listed firms (constituents of the SSE Corporate Governance Index, 
firms cross-listed overseas, and financial companies) to issue CSR reports, and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) requires constituents of the SZSE 100 Index to provide CSR reports. 
Those mandatory disclosers are coded zero for this variable. Voluntary and mandatory 
disclosers likely have different CSR performance (Marquis & Qian, 2014). (3) Cross-listing 
(CrossList), a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is cross-listed in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and zero otherwise. Firms cross-listed in Hong Kong may perform better in CSR 
due to strong monitoring of international investors. (4) Shanghai Stock Exchange (SH-Exch), 
a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and zero if 
listed in the Shenzhen market. As firms traded in the two Chinese stock exchanges may be 
















4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of regression variables for 3,035 firm-year 
observations from 2009 to 2014. We winsorize all the continuous variables at the top and 
bottom 1% to mitigate the impact of outliers. In the sample, the average CSR Score is around 
39 points and 75% of the firm-year observations receive scores less than 45, which suggests 
that overall there is plenty of room for Chinese firms to make improvement in CSR given that 
the full CSR Score is 100 points. The average value of the dummy variable BGroup is 0.76, 
which indicates that 76% of the observations are affiliated with business groups, confirming 
what we see from Panel B of Table 1.  
Regarding a firm’s economic characteristics, on average a sample firm has total assets 
(unlogged Size) of ¥ 94,168 million (equivalent to US$ 14,161 million approximately), 
achieves decent profitability with a return on assets (ROA) of 6.4%, holds 16% of its assets in 
cash, has a debts-to-assets ratio (Leverage) of 47%, and has been established for around 15 
years (unlogged FirmAge). In addition, 66% of the observations are state-owned enterprises 
as shown by the average value of the dummy variable SOE. As for corporate governance, an 
average firm has a board size (B-Size) of about 10 members, 37% of its board members are 
independent (B-Indep), and 7% of the board members (B-F-Exp) and 4% of the members in 
the top management team (TMT-F-Exp) have foreign experience. Approximately 5% of all 
the firm-year observations have female CEOs (Fem-CEO). Compared with typical western 
companies, Chinese firms in this sample have highly concentrated ownership structures as the 
average value of Own-Con is 39%, which is the proportion of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder (usually the state). Some other interesting facts revealed by the descriptive 
statistics include: 32% of the observations voluntarily release CSR reports in the absence of 














Hong Kong Stock Exchange that is open to international investors (CrossList), and more than 
half (62%) of the firms are listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SH-Exch). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 displays the Pearson correlation matrix for the regression variables. We 
observe a negative and statistically significant correlation between the business group 
affiliation (BGroup) and CSR Score, consistent with a potentially negative association 
between business groups and CSR performance. The matrix also shows that there are 
significant correlations among some independent variables and hence we calculate variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) to examine whether there is a potential multicollinearity problem. The 
maximum VIF is 2.77 (Size) and the mean VIF is 1.44. As all the VIFs are far less than 10, 
the conventional cut-off value (Ryan, 1997), we believe that multicollinearity is not a serious 
concern for the results. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
4.2. Univariate tests 
Table 4 presents the results of the univariate tests that compare two groups of firms, 
one with business group affiliations and the other without (i.e., BG firms and non-BG firms). 
There are 736 observations of non-BG firms and 2,299 observations of BG firms. The table 
shows that the mean (median) CSR Score is around 41 (37) points for non-BG firms, higher 
than the mean (median) value of 38 (35) points for BG firms. The corresponding t-statistic 
and Wilcoxon z-statistic are 5.73 and 4.47, respectively, indicating that both the mean and 
median differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Examining the univariate test 
results of the four components of the total score (i.e., M Comp, C Comp, T Comp, and I 
Comp), we see that for almost all the pairs of comparisons, non-BG firms receive higher 














the univariate tests provide initial evidence that BG firms have lower CSR performance than 
non-BG firms. 
Regarding comparisons of firm characteristics, Table 4 shows that the two groups of 
firms are different in many aspects. For example, BG firms generally are larger and older, 
hold a smaller proportion of their assets in cash, are more likely to be SOEs, and are less 
likely to issue CSR reports voluntarily. These differences highlight the importance of 
controlling various firm characteristics in multivariate regression analysis. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
4.3. Multivariate regression tests 
Table 5 displays the regression results of Hypothesis 1 regarding the impact of 
business groups on firms’ CSR performance. The results are presented in four columns in a 
progressive manner, and the dependent variable is CSR Score in all four columns. Column 1 
contains only the independent variable BGroup; Column 2 adds firms’ economic 
characteristics, such as size, ROA, cash holdings, and leverage; Column 3 further adds firms’ 
corporate governance variables, such as board size, board independence, and foreign 
experience of board members; Column 4 presents the most complete model that contains four 
more variables controlling for some other relevant factors, such as regional development, 
voluntary disclosure, and cross-listing. In Column 4, we also include the year and industry 
fixed effects to control for possible impacts of time and industry on a firm’s CSR 
performance. Industry categories are based on the classification by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
The table shows that in Columns 2 to 4, the estimated coefficient of the independent 
variable BGroup is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. (The significance 














not include any control variables.) In the most complete regression model presented in 
Column 4, the coefficient of BGroup is 2.575, meaning that on average, a firm with a 
business group affiliation receives a CSR rating that is 2.575 points lower than that received 
by a stand-alone company. Given the mean (median) CSR Score of 38.878 (35.480) as shown 
in Table 2, a score lower by 2.575 suggests that all else being equal, a BG firm 
underperforms a non-BG counterpart in CSR by 6.6% (7.3%), an economically significant 
difference. Regarding the control variables, the table shows that a larger firm size (Size), 
higher profitability (ROA), a larger board size (B-Size), a higher percentage of board 
members with foreign experience (B-F-Exp), and better regional development have positive 
effects on a firm’s CSR performance, while operating with a higher debts-to-assets ratio 
(Leverage) has a negative impact on CSR activities. 
Overall, the regression results support Hypothesis 1 that BG and non-BG firms have 
different CSR performance. Moreover, the results indicate that non-BG firms perform better 
than BG firms, consistent with the view that firms affiliated with business groups do not have 
strong incentives to perform well in CSR as encouraged by the government and urged by the 
general public because those firms already possess stronger political legitimacy and operate 
in more secure business environments compared with stand-alone companies.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
To investigate whether the results in Table 5 are different among different dimensions 
of CSR performance, we conduct further tests to examine the effects of business groups on 
four aspects of firms’ CSR engagement. Table 6 presents the regression results where the 
dependent variables are the four components of the total CSR score: M Comp (Column 1), C 
Comp (Column 2), T Comp (Column 3), and I Comp (Column 4), representing the 
Macrocosm, Content, Technique, and Industry components, respectively. All the regression 














is no industry fixed effect in the last column because the dependent variable is I Comp (i.e., 
the industry component of CSR ratings), which already considers industry differences. Table 
6 shows that across all the four columns, the independent variable BGroup loads with a 
negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, BG firms 
perform poorer in CSR than non-BG firms not only at the aggregate level but also in all the 
four individual aspects. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
To test Hypothesis 2 concerning the combined effect of the business group affiliation 
plus the SOE status, we divide the sample into two subsamples, one of SOEs and the other of 
non-SOEs. We run regressions separately with the two subsamples using the most complete 
model except that the control variable SOE is removed. Table 7 displays the results.  
Column 1 presents the result of the non-SOE subsample with 1,022 observations. 
Here the dependent variable is CSR Score. This column shows that the estimated coefficient 
of BGroup is not statistically significant, suggesting that among non-state-owned firms, 
business group affiliations do not make a difference in CSR performance. Column 2 displays 
the result of the SOE subsample with 2,013 observations. The dependent variable again is 
CSR Score. This column shows that BGroup loads with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient 2.830, indicating that among state-owned firms, business group affiliations are 
negatively associated with CSR performance. To find out whether the result is different for 
different dimensions of CSR performance, we repeat the regression with the SOE subsample 
and use the four components of CSR scores as the dependent variables. Columns 3, 4, 5, and 
6 present the regression results where the dependent variables are M Comp, C Comp, T 
Comp, and I Comp, respectively. Similar to what is displayed in Column 2, BGroup continues 
to load with a negative and statistically significant coefficient in each of Columns 3 to 6. 














differs between SOEs and non-SOEs. It seems that being a business group member alone 
does not provide strong enough legitimacy to “shield” a firm from seriously engaging in CSR 
activities, but a business group membership combined with an SOE status provides strong 
“protection” for a firm to have poorer CSR performance. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
5. Summary and conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of firms’ business group affiliations on their CSR 
performance. Using a Chinese sample of 3,035 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2014, we 
find that non-BG firms perform better than BG firms in CSR. This finding applies to not only 
the overall CSR performance measured by the total CSR score but also four dimensions of 
CSR performance measured by four components of the total score. Furthermore, after the 
sample is divided into SOEs and non-SOEs, it reveals that our finding continues to hold in 
the subsample of SOEs but not in the subsample of non-SOEs.  
Overall, the results suggest that a firm’s dual-status of being a business group member 
and an SOE at the same time leads to poorer performance in CSR. Our findings are consistent 
with the view that CSR engagement is a strategy for firms to pursue political legitimacy from 
the government and seek legitimacy in general from the public. The business group affiliation 
and the SOE status together afford political legitimacy to the firm and reduce its need to 
pursue legitimacy in general due to the relatively secure environment provided by the group. 
This study has implications for the general public and policymakers in China who have been 
supportive of business groups during the country’s economic reform.  
This study has some limitations. First, it is conducted with Chinese publicly traded 
firms that have issued CSR reports, and hence the findings may not be generalizable to other 
firms that are not listed on the stock markets or have not issued CSR reports. Second, the 














motivations are likely to be correlated with firms’ different CSR performance. Our control 
variable Voluntary is coded in a way that controls for mandatory disclosure required by 
regulations of the stock markets. However, it is possible that a business group also imposes 
some internal rules mandating its member firms to disclose CSR reports. As the internal rules 
are not public information and usually not accessible to researchers, we acknowledge that 
Voluntary in this study, as well as the similar variable in other related studies, contains noise. 
With these caveats, our paper contributes to the literature by being the first large-sample 
study that provides systemic evidence revealing the negative effect of business group 














Appendix. Variable definitions  
Variable  Definition 
Dependent variable: CSR Performance 
CSR Score The total score of a firm’s CSR rating in year t. It ranges from 0 to 
100 and is the sum of four component scores (Macrocosm, Content, 
Technique, and Industry). The total score measures the firm’s overall 
CSR performance.  
M Comp The Macrocosm component of a firm’s CSR rating in year t. It 
measures the firm’s overall CSR strategy and corporate governance. 
C Comp The Content component of a firm’s CSR rating in year t. It measures 
the firm’s specific CSR activities, such as in the areas of 
environment protection, consumer rights, labor and human rights, 
and community development. 
T Comp The Technique component of a firm’s CSR rating in year t. It 
measures the disclosure quality of the firm’s CSR report, such as 
comprehensiveness, comparability, consistency, and reliability of 
information disclosed in the report. 
I Comp The Industry component of a firm’s CSR rating in year t. It measures 
the firm’s industry-specific CSR activities.  
Independent variable: Business Group 
BGroup  A dummy variable that equals one if a firm is affiliated with a 
business group in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Control variables (measured at the end of year t-1 unless specified otherwise) 
Firm economic characteristics: 
Size Firm size, computed as the logarithm of a firm’s total assets. 
ROA Return on assets, computed as a firm’s net income divided by total 
assets. 
Cash  A firm’s cash scaled by total assets. 
Leverage  A firm’s total debts scaled by total assets.  
FirmAge Firm age, the logarithm of the number of years since a firm was 
established. 
SOE A dummy variable to indicate a state-owned enterprise (SOE) versus 
a private firm. It equals one if a firm is an SOE and zero otherwise. 
Corporate governance: 
B-Size Board size, measured by the total number of directors on the board. 
B-Indep Board independence, measured by the ratio of outside directors on 
the board. 
B-F-Exp Board foreign experience, measured by the ratio of board members 














educational or working experience gained overseas. 
TMT-F-Exp Top management team (TMT) foreign experience, measured by the 
ratio of members in the TMT who have foreign experience. Foreign 
experience is defined as either educational or working experience 
gained overseas. 
Fem-CEO Female CEO. It is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is 
female and zero otherwise. 
Own-Con Ownership concentration, measured by the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder. 
Other relevant factors: 
Reg-Dep Regional development, measured by the gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita of the province where a firm is headquartered. 
Voluntary Voluntary disclosure, a dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
voluntarily releases a CSR report without being required to do so by 
regulations. 
CrossList Cross-listing, a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is cross-listed 
in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. 
SH-Exch Shanghai Stock Exchange, a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is 
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Table 1. Sample description 
 






No. of all 
listed firms 
% of all listed 
firms 
2009 324 10.68% 1,759 18.42% 
2010 425 14.00% 2,090 20.33% 
2011 487 16.05% 2,390 20.38% 
2012 550 18.12% 2,563 21.46% 
2013 613 20.20% 2,576 23.80% 
2014 636 20.96% 2,676 23.77% 
Total 3,035 100.00%   
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of business group affiliated firms (BG firms) in the sample 
 
Year 
No. of BG 
firm-year obs. 
Percent 
% of the 
whole sample 
% of all listed 
firms 
2009 256 11.14% 79.01% 14.55% 
2010 335 14.57% 78.82% 16.03% 
2011 369 16.05% 75.77% 15.44% 
2012 414 18.01% 75.27% 16.15% 
2013 453 19.70% 73.90% 17.59% 
2014 472 20.53% 74.21% 17.64% 
Total 2,299 100.00% 75.75%  
 
 
This table presents the sample distribution by year from 2009 to 2014. Firms included in the sample are listed in 

















Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables Mean Standard deviation p25 Median p75 
CSR Score 38.878  13.267  29.780  35.480  44.570  
M Comp 12.770  4.818  9.140  12.070  15.470  
C Comp 17.726  6.111  13.540  16.520  20.530  
T Comp 6.656  2.098  5.400  5.960  7.160  
I Comp 1.746  1.787  0.390  1.250  2.500  
BGroup  0.757  0.429  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Size (Unlogged, ¥ MM) 94,168.040  438,517.300  2,496.112  6,350.492  18,793.410  
ROA 0.064  0.070  0.019  0.047  0.093  
Cash  0.161  0.140  0.062  0.122  0.216  
Leverage 0.473  0.219  0.317  0.482  0.633  
FirmAge (Unlogged) 14.742  5.021  12.000  15.000  18.000  
SOE 0.663  0.473  0.000  1.000  1.000  
B-Size 9.723  2.383  9.000  9.000  11.000  
B-Indep 0.371  0.057  0.333  0.353  0.400  
B-F-Exp 0.065  0.107  0.000  0.000  0.111  
TMT-F-Exp 0.038  0.096  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Fem-CEO 0.045  0.208  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Own-Con 0.388  0.165  0.247  0.387  0.511  
Reg-Dep (¥ 10K) 5.542  2.281  3.579  5.264  7.194  
Voluntary 0.320  0.467  0.000  0.000  1.000  
CrossList 0.088  0.284  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SH-Exch 0.619  0.486  0.000  1.000  1.000  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the regression variables for 3,035 firm-year observations from 2009 
to 2014. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to mitigate the impact of outliers. 














Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix  
 
(1) CSR Score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(2) BGroup -0.10                  
 (0.00)                  
(3) Size 0.58  0.02                 
 (0.00)  (0.26)                 
(4) ROA -0.02  0.01  -0.15                
 (0.39)  (0.48)  (0.00)                
(5) Cash  -0.10  -0.13  -0.24  0.18               
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)               
(6) Leverage 0.20  0.02  0.54  -0.41  -0.30              
 (0.00)  (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)              
(7) FirmAge -0.04  0.07  0.02  -0.02  -0.16  0.11             
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.28)  (0.00)  (0.00)             
(8) SOE 0.12  0.29  0.26  -0.10  -0.15  0.14  0.07            
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)            
(9) B-Size 0.35  -0.04  0.48  -0.06  -0.09  0.25  0.04  0.17           
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.00)           
(10) B-Indep 0.02  0.00  0.06  -0.02  -0.04  0.00  -0.11  -0.02  -0.27          
 (0.21)  (0.88)  (0.00)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.81)  (0.00)  (0.25)  (0.00)          
(11) B-F-Exp 0.36  -0.05  0.34  0.01  -0.04  0.07  -0.09  0.00  0.20  0.03         
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.69)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.83)  (0.00)  (0.16)         
(12) TMT-F-Exp 0.26  -0.06  0.26  -0.02  0.02  0.08  -0.08  -0.01  0.13  0.01  0.52        
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.78)  (0.00)  (0.44)  (0.00)        
(13) Fem-CEO -0.03  -0.04  -0.06  0.08  -0.01  -0.01  0.06  -0.12  -0.06  -0.03  -0.01  0.00       
 (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.56)  (0.93)       
(14) Own-Con 0.11  0.29  0.19  0.08  -0.08  -0.03  -0.21  0.28  -0.05  0.09  0.02  0.04  -0.03      
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.04)  (0.06)      
(15) Reg-Dep 0.26  -0.05  0.23  -0.02  -0.04  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.06  0.19  0.16  -0.06  0.15     
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.40)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.35)  (0.01)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
(16) Voluntary -0.13  -0.17  -0.41  -0.03  0.12  -0.21  -0.08  -0.33  -0.23  0.00  -0.06  -0.06  0.03  -0.09  -0.05    












(17) CrossList 0.32  -0.01  0.45  -0.06  -0.12  0.14  -0.10  0.17  0.25  0.07  0.35  0.24  -0.06  0.12  0.16  -0.14   
 (0.00)  (0.45)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
(18) SH-Exch 0.05  0.16  0.22  -0.09  -0.20  0.16  0.05  0.27  0.11  -0.03  -0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.13  0.19  -0.45  0.19  
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.98)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
 
This table displays the Pearson correlation matrix of the regression variables for 3,035 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2014. The p-values are presented in parentheses 














Table 4. Univariate tests 
 
 Non-BG Firms 
(N=736) 
BG Firms  
(N=2,299) 
Difference  
(Non-BG vs. BG) 
 Mean Median Mean Median t-stats z-stats 
CSR Score 41.304  36.950  38.101  35.120  5.73*** 4.47*** 
M Comp 13.695  12.890  12.474  11.720  6.02*** 5.98*** 
C Comp 18.609  16.880  17.443  16.500  4.52*** 2.88*** 
T Comp 7.040  6.025  6.533  5.920  5.73*** 3.03*** 
I Comp 2.011  1.250  1.661  1.250  4.63*** 2.34** 
Size 22.751  22.084  22.831  22.662  -1.12 -6.08*** 
ROA 0.062  0.048  0.064  0.047  -0.70 0.34 
Cash 0.192  0.130  0.151  0.119  7.07*** 3.59*** 
Leverage 0.465  0.459  0.475  0.488  -1.11 -2.01** 
FirmAge (Unlogged) 14.446  14.000  14.833  15.000  -1.87* -2.18** 
SOE 0.418  0.000  0.742  1.000  -16.88*** -16.14*** 
B-Size 9.909  9.000  9.663  9.000  2.44** -1.18 
B-Indep 0.372  0.333  0.371  0.357  0.15 0.07 
B-F-Exp 0.075  0.000  0.062  0.000  2.91** 2.86** 
TMT-F-Exp 0.048  0.000  0.035  0.000  3.34*** 5.44*** 
Fem-CEO 0.060  0.000  0.040  0.000  2.20** 2.20** 
Own-Con 0.304  0.261  0.414  0.415  -16.39*** -16.26*** 
Reg-Dep 5.743  5.795  5.477  5.257  2.76*** 3.17*** 
Voluntary 0.461  0.000  0.275  0.000  9.54*** 9.40*** 
CrossList 0.095  0.000  0.086  0.000  0.75 0.75 
SH-Exch 0.482  0.000  0.662  1.000  -8.87*** -8.76*** 
  
This table presents the results of the univariate tests that compare two groups of firms, one with business group 
affiliations and the other without (i.e., BG firms and non-BG firms). The full sample consists of 3,035 firm-year 
observations from 2009 to 2014. The t-test is used to test the difference of means, and the Wilcoxon z-test is 
used to test the difference of medians. All the continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to 
mitigate the impact of outliers. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
















Table 5. Regression results about the impact of business groups on CSR performance  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CSR Score CSR Score CSR Score CSR Score 
     
BGroup -3.202** -3.593*** -3.429*** -2.575*** 
 (-2.43) (-3.79) (-3.80) (-2.79) 
Size  5.236*** 4.336*** 3.958*** 
  (17.66) (12.24) (10.07) 
ROA  5.421 4.727 9.083** 
  (1.19) (1.03) (2.09) 
Cash   -0.952 -0.995 -1.892 
  (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.75) 
Leverage  -8.705*** -7.088*** -4.356** 
  (-4.37) (-3.68) (-2.14) 
FrimAge  -1.219 -0.676 -2.029* 
  (-1.13) (-0.63) (-1.81) 
SOE  0.281 0.432 1.140 
  (0.33) (0.50) (1.28) 
B-Size   0.419* 0.549** 
   (1.95) (2.58) 
B-Indep   1.191 0.995 
   (0.20) (0.18) 
B-F-Exp   16.345*** 13.731*** 
   (3.40) (2.64) 
TMT-F-Exp   5.763 4.192 
   (1.21) (0.79) 
Fem-CEO   0.664 1.769 
   (0.40) (1.09) 
Own-Con   1.974 0.894 
   (0.82) (0.37) 
Reg-Dep    0.357* 
    (1.82) 
Voluntary    1.143 
    (1.57) 
CrossList    0.983 
    (0.52) 
SH-Exch    -1.272 
    (-1.51) 
Constant 41.304*** -70.821*** -59.277*** -60.913*** 
 (34.34) (-10.49) (-8.72) (-7.29) 
     
Observations 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 
Adj. R2 0.010 0.370 0.394 0.455 
Year Fixed No No No Yes 
Industry Fixed No No No Yes 
 
This table presents the regression results of Hypothesis 1 regarding the impact of business groups on firms’ CSR 














the sum of four component scores. BGroup is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is affiliated with a 
business group in year t, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of the other variables. In all 
the regressions, standard errors are clustered at the firm dimension. In Column 4, year and industry fixed effects 
are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical 
















Table 6. Regression results about the impact of business groups on four dimensions of CSR 
performance 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES M Comp C Comp T Comp I Comp 
     
BGroup -0.840*** -1.198*** -0.421*** -0.333*** 
 (-2.87) (-2.66) (-2.82) (-3.25) 
Size 1.269*** 1.805*** 0.583*** 0.426*** 
 (9.64) (9.72) (9.00) (10.28) 
ROA 0.870 6.342*** 1.509** 0.390 
 (0.56) (3.04) (2.32) (0.83) 
Cash  -0.289 -0.897 -0.844* 0.403 
 (-0.34) (-0.78) (-1.95) (1.47) 
Leverage -1.716** -1.704* -0.668** -0.490** 
 (-2.44) (-1.78) (-2.08) (-2.36) 
FirmAge -0.645* -0.826 -0.527*** -0.148 
 (-1.68) (-1.58) (-2.70) (-1.26) 
SOE 0.361 0.612 -0.006 0.239** 
 (1.22) (1.42) (-0.04) (2.35) 
B-Size 0.177** 0.252*** 0.091** 0.074*** 
 (2.45) (2.59) (2.46) (3.17) 
B-Indep 0.666 -0.080 -0.087 0.500 
 (0.34) (-0.03) (-0.10) (0.72) 
B-F-Exp 4.005** 7.123*** 1.674** 0.921* 
 (2.36) (2.89) (2.13) (1.71) 
TMT-F-Exp 1.751 1.554 0.530 0.882* 
 (0.93) (0.64) (0.67) (1.73) 
Fem-CEO 0.828 0.669 0.187 -0.029 
 (1.51) (0.85) (0.80) (-0.17) 
Own-Con 0.195 0.660 -0.048 -0.088 
 (0.24) (0.58) (-0.13) (-0.32) 
Reg-Dep 0.122* 0.133 0.076** 0.020 
 (1.80) (1.44) (2.48) (0.97) 
Voluntary 0.453* 0.486 0.324*** -0.026 
 (1.76) (1.39) (2.68) (-0.27) 
CrossList 0.229 0.361 0.412 0.077 
 (0.36) (0.43) (1.28) (0.40) 
SH-Exch -0.717** -0.512 0.021 0.083 
 (-2.46) (-1.31) (0.16) (0.83) 
Constant -20.969*** -25.416*** -6.584*** -10.067*** 
 (-7.44) (-6.43) (-4.67) (-11.65) 
     
Observations 3,035 3,035 3,035 3,035 
Adj. R2 0.484 0.392 0.386 0.422 
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes 















This table presents the regression results concerning the impact of business groups on four dimensions of firms’ 
CSR performance. The dependent variables are the four components of the total CSR score: M Comp (Column 
1), C Comp (Column 2), T Comp (Column 3), and I Comp (Column 4), representing the Macrocosm, Content, 
Technique, and Industry components, respectively. BGroup is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
affiliated with a business group in year t, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of the other 
variables. In regressions (1) to (3), year and industry fixed effects are included. In regression (4), only the year 
fixed effect is included because the dependent variable I Comp already considers industry differences. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm dimension in all regressions. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
















Table 7. Regression results about the impact of business groups on firms’ CSR performance 
with the SOE and the non-SOE subsamples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Non-SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE 
VARIABLES CSR Score CSR Score M Comp C Comp T Comp I Comp 
       
BGroup -1.276 -2.830** -0.861** -1.299* -0.547** -0.353** 
 (-1.10) (-2.01) (-1.98) (-1.91) (-2.33) (-2.47) 
Size 2.961*** 4.231*** 1.374*** 1.895*** 0.658*** 0.423*** 
 (4.46) (8.83) (8.62) (8.26) (8.55) (8.69) 
ROA 12.442** 8.117 0.286 5.302** 1.917** 0.531 
 (2.00) (1.47) (0.14) (1.99) (2.34) (0.92) 
Cash  -3.494 -2.449 -0.493 -1.068 -1.012* 0.181 
 (-1.04) (-0.70) (-0.40) (-0.68) (-1.76) (0.49) 
Leverage -3.096 -4.339* -1.854** -1.689 -0.591 -0.510** 
 (-1.10) (-1.66) (-2.04) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-2.00) 
FirmAge -2.590* -0.976 -0.366 -0.256 -0.416 -0.131 
 (-1.79) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.34) (-1.48) (-0.83) 
B-Size 0.401 0.615** 0.196** 0.274** 0.098** 0.072** 
 (1.28) (2.32) (2.19) (2.30) (2.16) (2.54) 
B-Indep -4.717 1.833 0.951 0.725 -0.157 0.229 
 (-0.54) (0.25) (0.39) (0.21) (-0.13) (0.27) 
B-F-Exp 4.433 18.181*** 5.692*** 8.882*** 2.220** 1.261* 
 (0.74) (2.72) (2.63) (2.80) (2.19) (1.82) 
TMT-F-Exp 10.118 1.494 0.729 0.597 -0.105 0.915 
 (1.29) (0.24) (0.33) (0.21) (-0.12) (1.58) 
Fem-CEO -1.918 5.650* 2.295** 2.353 0.687 0.076 
 (-1.47) (1.80) (2.24) (1.56) (1.59) (0.24) 
Own-Con 2.596 0.051 -0.050 0.346 -0.349 -0.017 
 (0.74) (0.02) (-0.05) (0.23) (-0.70) (-0.05) 
Reg-Dep 0.219 0.348 0.119 0.135 0.070** 0.010 
 (0.55) (1.54) (1.51) (1.27) (2.02) (0.45) 
Voluntary -0.077 1.727* 0.577* 0.777* 0.454*** -0.033 
 (-0.06) (1.95) (1.77) (1.84) (2.97) (-0.28) 
CrossList 10.341** -0.681 -0.299 -0.432 0.132 -0.120 
 (2.03) (-0.35) (-0.45) (-0.51) (0.40) (-0.62) 
SH-Exch -3.130** -0.088 -0.434 0.102 0.219 0.154 
 (-2.35) (-0.08) (-1.17) (0.21) (1.30) (1.29) 
Constant -29.792** -61.974*** -21.931*** -24.401*** -8.264*** -9.843*** 
 (-2.11) (-6.09) (-6.44) (-5.00) (-5.11) (-8.98) 
       
Observations 1,022 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 2,013 
Adj. R2 0.457 0.460 0.485 0.393 0.421 0.436 
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 















This table presents the regression results concerning the impact of business groups on firms’ CSR performance 
with the SOE and the non-SOE subsamples. Columns 1 and 2 present the results on non-SOEs and SOEs, 
respectively, with CSR Score as the dependent variable. Columns 3 to 6 present the results on SOEs with the 
dependent variable being the different component of CSR scores: M Comp (Column 3), C Comp (Column 4), T 
Comp (Column 5), and I Comp (Column 6). BGroup is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is affiliated 
with a business group in year t, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of the other variables. 
In regressions (1) to (5), year and industry fixed effects are included. In regression (6), only the year fixed effect 
is included because the dependent variable I Comp already considers industry differences. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm dimension in all regressions. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts 
















 We study the impact of Chinese firms’ business group affiliations on their CSR 
performance 
 We find firms with business group affiliations have weaker performance in CSR 
 The finding holds in the subsample of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) only 
 Results consistent with the view that CSR engagement is a strategy to pursue 
legitimacy  
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